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Abstract: 
The current research examined whether nations differ in their attitudes toward action and 
inaction. It was anticipated that members of dialectical East Asian societies would show a 
positive association in their attitudes toward action/inaction. However, members of non-
dialectical European-American societies were expected to show a negative association in their 
attitudes toward action/inaction. Young adults in 19 nations completed measures of dialectical 
thinking and attitudes toward action/inaction. Results from multi-level modeling showed, as 
predicted, that people from high dialecticism nations reported a more positive association in their 
attitudes toward action and inaction than people from low dialecticism nations. Furthermore, 
these findings remained after controlling for cultural differences in individualism-collectivism, 
neuroticism, gross-domestic product, and response style. Discussion highlights the implications 
of these findings for action/inaction goals, dialecticism, and culture. 
 action research | attitudes | attitudinal ambivalence | culture and cognition | Keywords:
culture/ethnicity 
Article: 
For centuries, people have been fascinated by differences between cultures and societies 
(Herodotus, 1998). Cultures differ in a variety of obvious ways, such as language, diet, and 
dress. Yet there are also more subtle differences between cultures that have been identified 
through systematic research (Heine, 2010). For example, European American societies stress 
independence and autonomy of the self, while some East Asian and Latin American societies 
stress interdependence and harmonization of the self with others (Triandis, 1989). Furthermore, 
members of European American societies tend to see the world as fixed and unchanging, 
whereas members of East Asian societies see the world as full of contradiction and change (Peng 
& Nisbett, 1999). Finally, cultures vary in their rates of active and inactive behavior. That is, 
some nations are more active than others as measured by walking and postal speed (Levine & 
Norenzayan, 1999), frequency of naps (Masa et al., 2006), and frequency of communications, 
voting, and stimulant use, among other behaviors (Noguchi, Handley, & Albarracín, 2011). The 
current research asks whether nations differ in their attitudes toward action (ATA) and inaction 
(ATI), including how useful they think action and inaction are for daily life (McCulloch, Li, 
Hong, & Albarracín, 2012). We conceptualize action and inaction as two endpoints along a 
continuum of activity with frequent and/or intense output (e.g., running) occupying the action 
end, and infrequent and/or reduced output (e.g., sleeping) occupying the inaction end 
(seeAlbarracín, Hepler, & Tannenbaum, 2011). 
Intuitively, some societies seem to value action and inaction to different degrees than others. For 
example, many European American societies promote a Protestant Work Ethic, which strongly 
values extended periods of laborious activity, and consider extended periods of inactivity as 
indicative of laziness (Weber, 1930). Conversely, some East Asian societies promote the benefits 
of occasional periods of inactivity, as evidenced by the prominent role of silent meditative 
practices in Buddhism (Wallace & Shapiro, 2006), and principle of inaction (Wu Wei) expressed 
as a core tenant of Daoism (Graham, 2001). Other societies show greater appreciation of inaction 
by mandating elevated levels of vacation time for employees, and by practicing dailysiestas, 
which interrupt work-related activity for occasional periods of rest and recovery. However, 
despite these observations, and the fact that individual and regional variations in action goals 
predict important outcomes including eating, exercise, problem solving, learning, and voting 
(Albarracín et al., 2008; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Laran, 2010; Noguchi et al., 2011), it 
remains unknown whether nations differ in their ATA and ATI, and why such differences might 
arise. The current research addresses these gaps by first, measuring ATA and ATI across 19 
diverse societies. In addition, this research tests whether dialecticism, a prominent cultural 
variable that promotes seeing the world as full of contradiction and change (Peng & Nisbett, 
1999), is associated with regional variations in action/inaction attitudes. 
There is a good reason to assume that cultural differences in dialecticism would predict ATA and 
ATI. According to a growing body of research, dialectical thinking, which is the tendency to 
report and embrace contradictory beliefs, mediates cultural differences in self-evaluation, 
emotional complexity, and in-group favoritism (Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010). 
Specifically, although nondialectical Euro Americans tend to rate themselves and their groups 
positively, dialectical East Asians more often report contradictory evaluations of themselves and 
their groups, where they readily admit both positive and negative aspects as simultaneously 
existing within these targets (Ma-Kellams, Spencer-Rodgers, & Peng, 2011; Spencer-Rodgers, 
Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009). Moreover, cultural differences are also observed in the 
evaluations of emotion, such that nondialectical Euro Americans tend to rate their present mood 
as positive or negative, but rarely both, whereas dialectical East Asians often report experiencing 
mixed positive and negative emotions at the same moment (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 
2002; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, & Wang, 2010). Because action and inaction are by definition 
oppositional constructs (Albarracín et al., 2008, 2011), it could be argued that members of 
dialectical East Asian societies would simultaneously perceive positive and negative aspects in 
both constructs and therefore report similar ATA and ATI. Conversely, members of 
nondialectical societies may show a strong preference for action, given their intolerance for 
contradiction, and thus rate action more positively than inaction. 
Beyond dialecticism, there are other reasons to assume that members of European American 
societies should show a stronger preference for action over inaction than members of East Asian 
societies. First, social ethics in Western Industrialist societies tend to promote work and 
industriousness more than idleness (Miller, Woehr, & Hudspeth, 2002). Second, in an American 
sample, endorsement of Christian religious beliefs was positively correlated with preference for 
action over inaction (McCulloch et al., 2012). Therefore, converging evidence suggests that 
religious and societal values in Western Industrialist societies predict increased valuation of 
action over inaction. In combination with prior work on dialecticism, therefore, these 
perspectives suggest that members of nondialectical cultures should show a strong preference for 
action over inaction, but that members of dialectical cultures should report a more balanced 
assessment of action and inaction. For example, East Asians may perceive action and inaction as 
similarly beneficial to society, whereas European Americans may perceive action as more 
beneficial than inaction. 
The primary aim of the current research was to explore whether cultures differ in their ATA and 
ATI, and whether cultural differences in dialecticism could be used to predict these attitudes. In 
this effort, data were collected from 19 diverse societies across the globe, including four East 
Asian societies (China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore). Multilevel modeling was used to 
assess whether cultural (i.e., national) differences in dialecticism predict the structure of people’s 
ATA and ATI.1 It was anticipated that people from high dialecticism nations would report a 
more positive association in their action/inaction attitudes than people from low dialecticism 
nations. Further, it was anticipated that the relation between country-level dialecticism and 
ATA/ATI would remain after controlling for other cultural differences (i.e., individualism–
collectivism, neuroticism, and response style) as well as the gross domestic product (GDP) of the 
nations respectively. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Data were obtained in a cross-cultural study of young adults in 19 nations (see Table 1for sample 
characteristics). The study was conducted between the years 2006 and 2008. The sample 
included 3,797 college students (2,479 female). All study measures were constructed in English, 
translated, and then back-translated into the local languages by independent researchers. The use 
of college students helps ensure some degree of comparability in the samples in terms of age and 
level of education. All respondents completed questionnaires voluntarily and were awarded 
course credit for their participation. The current research examined four key measures out of 
several measures given during the original survey. 
Table 1. Sample Characteristics of the 19 Nations 
Nation  Data Collection 
Site  
Language of 
Survey  
Number of 
Participants  
Mean Age 
(SD)  
Percentage 
Female 
Argentina  Buenos Aires  Spanish  89  23.3 (6.7)  84.3 
Bolivia  Santa Cruz  Spanish  237  19.7 (3.1)  75.1 
China  Guangzhou  Chinese  288  20.2 (0.8)  54.5 
Colombia  Barranquilla  Spanish  196  19.9 (3.4)  82.2 
England  Cardiff  English  40  19.8 (1.8)  90.0 
Guatemala  Guatemala City  Spanish  179  20.1 (3.0)  36.9 
Hong Kong  Hong Kong  Chinese  155  20.0 (1.3)  38.1 
Israel  Ra’anana  Hebrew  241  27.3 (5.9)  81.7 
Italy  Rome  Italian  189  22.5 (3.6)  58.0 
Japan  Tokyo  Japanese  172  19.5 (1.1)  36.6 
Mexico  Mexico City  Spanish  198  22.7 (4.2)  61.6 
Norway  Oslo  Norwegian  53  27.7 (6.9)  77.4 
Philippines  Manila  English  150  17.0 (0.8)  82.0 
Portugal  Lisbon  Portuguese  204  29.2 
(11.1)  
80.1 
Singapore  Singapore  English  306  21.3 (1.7)  52.1 
Spain  Madrid  Spanish  179  21.2 (5.1)  82.9 
Switzerland  Lausanne  French  302  20.8 (4.0)  79.9 
Turkey  Istanbul  Turkish  382  22.8 (4.0)  79.9 
USA  Gainesville  English  237  19.2 (1.2)  66.5 
 
Measures 
Action/inaction attitudes 
ATA and ATI were measured using separate 5-item scales (McCulloch et al., 2012). Participants 
rated their agreement with items measuring ATA (action is important in people’s lives, action is 
essential for life, actions contribute to society, being active makes people happy, and action is 
good) as well as items measuring ATI (inaction is important in people’s lives, being inactive is 
unpleasant, inaction is good, inaction is necessary in one’s life,and inaction offers many 
benefits) on 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scales. Previous research found that these 
scales have adequate convergent and discriminant validity in a sample of American college 
students (McCulloch et al., 2012). Reliability coefficients (αs) for the ATA and ATI scales by 
country are reported in Table 2. Intraclass correlations for the ATA scale ranged from .11 to .40 
across countries. Intraclass correlations for the ATI scale ranged from .19 to .50 across countries. 
Results of a multilevel confirmatory factor analysis (MLCFA) on the ATA and ATI items 
showed that a correlated two-factor solution had good fit, root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) = .036, comparative fit index (CFI) = .95, standardized root mean 
square residual (SRMR)within = .035, SRMRbetween = .096. A one-factor solution with 10 items 
loading on a single action/inaction factor was also tested, yielding unsatisfactory fit (RMSEA > 
.10), further demonstrating that ATA and ATI are two separate factors instead of a single, bipolar 
factor. Finally, a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (multigroup CFA) showed that the 
action–inaction scale with a two-factor structure had adequate measurement equivalence across 
nations, RMSEA = .072, CFI = .93, SRMR = .061. 
Table 2. Alphas and Means for Key Constructs Across 19 Nations 
Nation  Alpha 
Dialect.  
Alpha 
ATA  
Alpha 
ATI  
Mean 
Dialect.  
Mean 
ATA  
Mean 
ATI  
Corr. 
ATAATI 
Argentina  .80  .38  .70  3.63  5.39  3.96  .28 
Bolivia  .69  .64  .58  3.60  5.70  3.25  .25 
China  .68  .68  .73  4.11  5.41  5.58  .61 
Colombia  .75  .60  .69  3.52  5.74  3.61  .23 
England  .82  .60  .82  3.92  5.83  5.54  .14 
Guatemala  .79  .66  .75  3.31  5.89  3.96  .19 
Hong Kong  .73  .64  .61  4.20  5.49  5.36  .56 
Israel  .79  .75  .80  3.59  5.76  3.81  .05 
Italy  .80  .67  .74  3.48  5.64  3.44  .28 
Japan  .77  .55  .53  4.19  5.48  5.48  .50 
Mexico  .76  .59  .67  3.56  5.42  3.72  .10 
Norway  .81  .70  .83  3.84  5.72  4.95  .33 
Philippines  .71  .46  .76  3.80  5.85  3.98  .10 
Portugal  .65  .71  .80  3.52  5.83  3.43  .18 
Singapore  .80  .64  .68  3.93  5.44  4.30  .13 
Spain  .83  .60  .74  3.61  5.39  4.00  .03 
Switzerland  .78  .72  .73  3.73  5.59  4.57  .22 
Turkey  .79  .75  .71  3.43  5.71  3.19  .31 
USA  .84  .77  .71  3.54  5.65  4.61  .16 
Note. ATA = attitudes toward action; ATI = attitudes toward inaction. 
Dialecticism 
Dialecticism was measured using the 32-item Dialectical Self-Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers et 
al., 2010). Participants rated their agreement with statements such as I sometimes believe two 
things that contradict each other and If there are two opposing sides to an argument, they cannot 
both be right (reverse scored) on 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scales. Previous 
research suggests that the DSS shows adequate convergent and predictive validity (Spencer-
Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004), such that scores on the DSS negatively correlate with need 
for closure, and predict more contradictory (i.e., ambivalent) self-attitudes. Additionally, 
previous research demonstrated that the DSS has adequate measurement equivalence across 
diverse samples including Caucasian Americans, Asian Americans, and Mainland Chinese 
(e.g., Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). Reliability coefficients for the DSS by country ranged from 
.65 to .84 (see Table 2), and intraclass correlations ranged from .06 to .14. These results suggest 
that the DSS has sufficient reliability within nations to justify aggregation of the items into 
nation-level scores. In addition, results of an MLCFA, taking into account within and between-
country variation, showed that a one-factor solution had excellent fit, RMSEA < .001, CFI = 
1.00, SRMRwithin < .001, SRMRbetween < .001, indicating that the 32 scale items tap a single latent 
construct representing dialecticism. Finally, a multigroup CFA showed that the dialecticism scale 
with a one-factor structure had excellent measurement equivalence across nations, RMSEA = 
.023, CFI = 1.00, and SRMR = .009. 
Individualism–collectivism 
Individualism–collectivism was measured to explore whether a prominent cultural factor, which 
has been shown to vary from East Asian to European American societies (Triandis, 1989), can 
account for regional variation in action/inaction attitudes. If ATA and ATI vary from East Asian 
to European American societies, as anticipated, then it is possible that this cultural variation is 
better captured by individualism–collectivism than by dialecticism. To explore this possibility, 
individualism–collectivism was measured using the Horizontal/Vertical Individualism–
Collectivism scale (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995). Participants rated their 
agreement with items such as I often do my own thing(individualism) and I usually sacrifice my 
self-interest for the benefit of my group(collectivism) on 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly 
agree) scales. According to prior research, the Horizontal/Vertical Individualism–Collectivism 
scale has adequate discriminant and cross-cultural validity (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 
2005;Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Alphas for the individualism and collectivism subscales ranged 
from .58 to .83 across nations, and intraclass correlations ranged from .08 to .23. Results of an 
MLCFA showed that the Individualism–Collectivism scale had good fit, RMSEA = .053, CFI = 
.98, SRMRwithin = .023, SRMRbetween = .041. Finally, a multigroup CFA showed that the 
Individualism–Collectivism scale with a one-factor structure had adequate measurement 
equivalence across nations, RMSEA = .078, CFI = .95, and SRMR = .055. 
Neuroticism 
According to prior work, East Asians score higher in neuroticism than European Americans 
(e.g., Wong, Lee, Ang, Oei, & Ng, 2009). Further, the experience of emotional lability (i.e., 
neuroticism) is correlated with emotional complexity, that is, the experience of positive and 
negative emotions simultaneously (Goetz, Spencer-Rodgers, & Peng, 2008). Thus, neuroticism 
may lead to complex and contradictory ATA/ATI similar to those predicted for dialecticism. To 
address this possibility, we administered a measure of neuroticism from the Big Five inventory 
(John & Srivastava, 1999). Participants rated their agreement with items such as I see myself as 
someone who can be moody and I see myself as someone who is emotionally stable, not easily 
upseton 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scales. Alphas ranged from .52 to .81 across 
nations, and intraclass correlations ranged from .12 to .35. Results of an MLCFA showed that a 
one-factor solution had good fit, RMSEA = .037, CFI = .99, SRMRwithin = .015, and 
SRMRbetween = .039. Further, a multigroup CFA showed that the Neuroticism scale had strong 
measurement equivalence across nations, RMSEA = .052, CFI = .99, and SRMR = .026. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Descriptive statistics for dialecticism and ATA/ATI are provided in Table 2. Based on the 
prevalence of East Asian philosophical traditions such as Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, 
four nations in this sample could be categorized as dialectical in nature: China, Japan, Hong 
Kong, and Singapore. Consistent with this categorization, the four East Asian societies had the 
highest mean responses on the Dialectical Self-Scale. Further, people in dialectical nations such 
as China, Japan, and Hong Kong (but not Singapore) reported a more positive correlation in their 
action/inaction attitudes than people from nondialectical nations. 
Across the entire sample (N = 3,797), dialecticism was significantly correlated with 
neuroticism, r = .36, p = .001, but was not significantly correlated with individualism–
collectivism, r = .01, p = .50. As anticipated, dialecticism was negatively correlated with 
ATA, r = −.19, p < .001, and positively correlated with ATI, r = .31, p < .001. Neuroticism 
showed similar, but weaker relations with ATA, r = −.06, p < .001, and ATI, r = .15, p < .001. 
Individualism–collectivism showed relatively weak associations with ATA, r = −.04, p = .02, 
and ATI, r = .12, p < .001. The relation between dialecticism and ATA remained largely 
unchanged after simultaneously controlling for neuroticism and individualism–collectivism, r = 
−.17, p < .001. Similarly, the relation between dialecticism and ATI remained largely unchanged 
after simultaneously controlling for neuroticism and individualism–collectivism, r = .27, p < 
.001. Across nations, therefore, dialecticism was associated with ATA and ATI, and these 
associations remained after controlling for both individualism–collectivism and neuroticism. 
Multilevel Modeling 
We conducted multilevel modeling to test our hypotheses about the relation between nation-level 
dialecticism and ATA/ATI. In all models, we arbitrarily used ATI as the outcome variable, and 
ATA as the predictor variable (see Schimmack et al., 2002 for a similar analytic approach). 
Because ATA and ATI were standardized across nations, the intercept was fixed to zero. For 
each model, we report standardized path coefficients (β). 
Base models 
We first tested the relation between ATA and ATI in a world sample of young adults, and 
whether this relation differs significantly across nations. For the total sample of young adults 
across the world, the relation between ATA and ATI was nonsignificant, β = .007, p = .80, 
indicating that ATA and ATI are relatively independent from each other. However, the relation 
between ATA and ATI did significantly vary across countries, variance of slope = .04, p < 001. 
Then, we added standardized dialecticism scores as a Level 2 (nation-level) variable in the 
model. Dialecticism explained a significant amount of variability between countries, β = 
.175, p < .001, such that people in high dialecticism countries had a more positive correlation in 
their action/inaction attitudes than people in low dialecticism countries, as anticipated.2 
Models with control variables 
Country-level neuroticism was also a significant predictor of the relation between ATA and ATI, 
such that people in high neuroticism nations showed a more positive correlation in their 
action/inaction attitudes than people in low neuroticism nations, β = .081, p = .044. However, the 
effect of neuroticism was much smaller than the effect of dialecticism (β of .175 vs. .081). 
Moreover, when neuroticism and dialecticism were simultaneously entered, dialecticism 
remained a significant predictor (β = .212, p < .001); yet, neuroticism was no longer a significant 
predictor in the model (β = .054, p = .131). Country-level individualism–collectivism was not a 
significant predictor of the relation between ATA and ATI within countries, β = .040, p = .282. 
Next, we ran a new model examining whether the GDP and sample size of the nations accounted 
for the relation between dialecticism and ATA/ATI. GDP was positively associated with the 
relation between ATA and ATI, such that people in countries with a high GDP reported a more 
positive association in their action/inaction attitudes than people in countries with a low GDP, β 
= .061, p < .001, but this effect was very small. Country-level sample size was not a significant 
predictor of the relation between ATA and ATI, β = .001, p = .952. Further, the effect of 
dialecticism remained significant after controlling for GDP and country-level sample size, β = 
.165, p < .001. With GDP and dialecticism in the model, all variance in the action/inaction 
correlation was accounted for. 
It is possible that the relation between ATA and ATI in dialectical cultures is inflated due to a 
response bias in these societies (e.g., responding the same way to all items). If the effect of 
culture on the ATA–ATI relation were merely a response style artifact, then the effect should 
disappear once nation’s reliabilities on the ATA and ATI scales are entered as Level 2 predictors 
in a multilevel analysis (see Schimmack et al., 2002). Reliability of the action scale was a 
significant predictor of the relation between ATA and ATI, β = .099, p = .012, but reliability of 
the inaction scale was not a significant predictor, β = .029, p = .248. More importantly, 
dialecticism remained a significant predictor of the relation between ATA and ATI even when 
cultural variations in response style were taken into account, β = .172, p < .001.3 
Finally, we examined the effect of dialecticism while controlling for two individual-level 
variables, age and gender. Age was not a significant predictor of the relation between ATA and 
ATI, β = .01, p = .83. Gender was a significant predictor of the relation between ATA and ATI, β 
= .086, p < .001. That is, women showed a more positive association in their action/inaction 
attitudes than men. The effect of gender was not moderated by country-level dialecticism, β = 
.009, p = .78, thus demonstrating that the effect of gender on ATA/ATI was consistent across 
high dialecticism and low dialecticism nations. Furthermore, dialecticism remained a significant 
predictor of the relation between ATA and ATI after controlling for age and gender, β = 
.176, p < .001. 
Separate models on action and inaction 
We conducted separate models on action and inaction to test whether dialecticism could be used 
to predict these individual outcomes. We anticipated that dialecticism would be positively 
associated with ATI and negatively associated with ATA. Country-level dialecticism was 
positively associated with ATI, β = .497, p < .001, such that people in high dialecticism nations 
had more positive ATI than people in low dialecticism nations. Additionally, dialecticism was 
negatively associated with ATA, β = −.337, p < .001, such that people in high dialecticism 
nations had more negative ATA than people from low dialecticism nation. In sum, although 
people from high dialecticism nations reported similar and moderate evaluations of action and 
inaction, people from low dialecticism nations showed a strong preference for action over 
inaction. 
Discussion 
Societies vary dramatically in their rates of active and inactive behavior, and these variations 
predict critically important outcomes such as voting (Noguchi et al., 2011). The current research 
asked whether nations differ in their attitudes toward action (ATA) and inaction (ATI), and 
whether cultural differences in dialecticism predict the structure of these attitudes. People from 
dialectical cultures more often report contradictory evaluations of opposing constructs (Peng & 
Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010), and subscribe to religious and/or 
philosophical beliefs that advocate periodic bouts of inactivity (Graham, 2001). On this basis, we 
anticipated that people from dialectical cultures would evidence greater balance in their attitudes 
toward the oppositional constructs of action and inaction than nondialectical cultures. 
Furthermore, we anticipated that nondialectical cultures would show a strong preference for 
action over inaction, given the prevalence of Judeo-Christian beliefs such as the Protestant work 
ethic in these societies (Miller et al., 2002; Weber, 1930). Data obtained from 19 diverse 
societies across the globe tested these predictions about the relation between cultural dialecticism 
and ATA/ATI. As anticipated, people from dialectical East Asian societies (i.e., China, Japan, 
and Hong Kong, but not Singapore) reported greater balance and moderation in their ATA and 
ATI than did people from other societies. 
More importantly, results from multilevel modeling suggest that people from high dialecticism 
nations report a more positive association in their ATA and ATI than people from low 
dialecticism nations, even after controlling for other important cultural and individual difference 
variables (i.e., GDP, individualism–collectivism, and neuroticism). Thus, the current research 
shows that ATA and ATI vary significantly across countries and regions, and that these 
variations can be predicted by dialecticism. Although several recent studies have uncovered the 
cognitive and behavioral consequences of priming action and inaction concepts (e.g., Albarracín 
et al., 2008,2011; Gendolla & Silvestrini, 2010; Laran, 2010), the current study is the first to 
begin exploring the foundations upon which action and inaction attitudes are derived. Our results 
demonstrate that the structure of people’s ATA and ATI may in part stem from cultural 
traditions, such as the degree to which one’s society embraces contradiction. Such findings 
highlight the role of dialecticism in action/inaction attitudes across countries and provide one 
piece to the puzzle as to why cultures might differ in their general orientation toward action and 
inaction (Noguchi et al., 2011). However, it is important to note that given the correlational 
nature of our design, causal inferences about the influence of dialecticism on action/inaction 
attitudes are not conclusive. 
Despite the growing interest in dialecticism (Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010), no 
research to our knowledge has administered a direct measure of dialecticism across a larger set 
of nations. Large numbers of countries should increase the probability that cross-country 
descriptions are not based on spurious differences between a limited set of nations that vary on 
factors other than dialecticism. Additionally, the use of large numbers of nations revealed 
unexpected patterns in ATA and ATI. In particular, Mediterranean societies showed among the 
largest preference for action, as indexed by a relatively strong negative correlation in 
action/inaction attitudes in some of these nations (e.g., Turkey, Italy, and Portugal). Future 
research is needed to further explore why Mediterranean societies show a strong preference for 
action over inaction. One possibility is that Mediterranean honor cultures emphasize taking 
action in response to perceived insults, rather than remaining passively inactive (Cohen, Nisbett, 
Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000). This might lead 
members of Mediterranean societies to view action as a more normative and appropriate 
response in many circumstances, especially those involving threats to reputation, than inaction. 
Undoubtedly, however, several factors may contribute to regional variations in action/inaction 
attitudes. The current research serves as an important starting point, by demonstrating that 
cultural differences in dialecticism predict regional variations in action/inaction attitudes. 
The current research has several important implications that could be expanded upon in future 
research. Complementing prior work demonstrating regional variations in active and inactive 
behavior (Noguchi et al. 2011), the current study showed regional variations in ATA and ATI 
and that cultural differences in dialecticism accounted for this variation. Future work is needed to 
examine whether measurements of ATA and ATI predict active and inactive behaviors. 
Additionally, future studies could examine the mental health implications of cultural variations 
in ATA and ATI. Cultures that value action over inaction may have increased rates of mania and 
impulsivity, whereas cultures that value inaction over action may have increased rates of 
depression. Finally, future research could examine whether endorsement of specific 
religious/philosophical traditions (i.e., Christianity, Buddhism, and Daoism) can be used to 
predict ATA/ATI in addition to variations in these attitudes across societies. 
In sum, data from 19 nations tested the assumption that cultural differences in dialecticism 
predict attitudes toward the general constructs of action and inaction. People from high 
dialecticism nations reported a more positive association in their ATA and ATI than people from 
low dialecticism nations. Such findings suggest that the country and culture in which one resides 
may predict attitudes toward basic constructs, such as how active or inactive one should be in 
their daily life. The current research, therefore, may serve as a launching point for future studies 
seeking to uncover the attitudinal underpinnings of regional variations in activity. 
Acknowledgment 
We thank our coauthors for statistical consultation and data from their respective locations. 
Article Notes 
• Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of 
interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. 
• Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or 
publication of this article. 
Notes 
• 1. Most samples corresponded to nations; however, where subnational boundaries could 
be identified on the basis of historical circumstances, they were treated as separate 
samples (i.e., Hong Kong and People’s Republic of China). 
• 2. As a supplemental analysis, we dummy coded the four East Asian countries as being 
dialectical, and the other countries as nondialectical, instead of using dialecticism as a 
continuous variable. Similar results were obtained so they are not included in the article. 
Further, although our primary focus was on nation-level dialecticism scores (Level 2), a 
supplemental analysis showed that dialecticism was also a moderator at Level 1, such that 
high dialecticism individuals showed a stronger association in their ATA and ATI than 
low dialecticism individuals, β = .084, p < .001. 
• 3. To clarify our reasoning, response styles should have two effects in this context. First, 
they should lead to inflated reliability estimates of ATA and ATI. Second, they should 
increase positive correlations (or attenuate negative correlations) between ATA and ATI. 
Therefore, cultural variation in response styles would produce a positive correlation 
between nations’ reliabilities of ATA and ATI and nations’ correlation between ATA and 
ATI. If the effect of culture on the ATA–ATI correlation were due solely to a response 
style artifact, then the effect should disappear once nations’ reliabilities of ATA and ATI 
are entered as Level 2 predictors. However, the effect of Level 2 dialecticism held after 
nations’ reliabilities of ATA and ATI were taken into account. This suggests that the 
effect of dialecticism was not merely a response style artifact. 
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